<table><tr>
<td><p>This study
examines the factors determining board structure at IPO, as well as the
long-run performance of firms after their IPO in the context of China—a
transitional economy. Specifically, three characteristics of the board are
considered: board size, board composition (i.e outsider ratio) and board
political connection (i.e CCP membership ratio). This study focuses on the
roles that two contrasting institutional investors – state and venture
capitalist (VC) play on board structure and the long-run performance of
firms. Based on a sample of 217 Chinese SMEs listed on the SME board of
Shenzhen Stock Exchange for the period of 2004 to 2010, the results suggest
that state ownership is positively associated with board size and CCP
membership ratio and negatively associated with outsider ratio. In addition,
there is a negative relationship between state ownership and firm long-run
performance and this relationship is mediated by board structure. Contrary to
the findings in developed markets, this study suggests that VC involvement
does not lead to more efficient board structure and superior performance in
Chinese SMEs.</p></td></tr></table>